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BOOK REVIEW
NONSTATE NATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: COMPARATIVE SYSTEM

Edited by Judy S. Bertelsen. Praeger Publishers, Inc.
New York, N.Y. 1977. Pp. 257. $25.00.
ANALYSES.

The field of international political studies has been devoted
primarily to an analysis of th,! nature and interrelationship of the
world's independent nation-states. While nonsovereign national
groups have engaged the interest of sociologists and anthropologists,
they have seldom been subject to the meticulous scrutiny and taxonomic efforts which political scientists expend upon legally sanctioned entities.' The relative neglect of nonstate nations-those nationalist entities which are not generally recognized as independent
states but which claim rights to national sovereignty-is most obviously regrettable. To that extent, Nonstate Nations in International Politics: Comparative System Analyses,' edited by Judy S.
Bertelsen, is, despite substantial limitations, a welcome addition to
the literature of international politics.
Focusing successively upon the Palestinian Arabs, the Zionist
movement (as one model for achievement of statehood), the Kurds,
the Spanish Basques, the Welsh, the Croatians, and the Navajo, the
individually authored case studies survey the history of each of
these national groups, applying a novel systems framework formulated in general and flexible terms. Bertelsen has developed this
approach by adapting the systems analysis initially set forth by C.
West Churchman. 3 As in an earlier effort,' Bertelsen, using and
"distorting" Churchman's ideas "somewhat,"' seeks to provide a
1. See, e.g., L.

SNYDER, VARIETIES OF NATIONALSM

286-309. The rather extensive bibliog-

raphy refers almost exclusively to books and articles pertaining to general political theory on
nationalism and to the development of the various nation-states.
2. NONSTATE NATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: CoMPARATIvE SYSTEM ANALVSs (J. Bertelsen ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as NONSTATE NATIONS]. Dr. Bertelsen, at the time of
publication a Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science at California State University,
Chico, is a Research Associate at the Institute for Scientific Analysis, San Francisco. She is
a member of the Council of the Comparative Interdisciplinary Studies Association of the
International Studies Association.
3. This systems analysis was first introduced in a scientific, rather than political, setting
in C. CHURCHMAN, THE SYSTEMS APPROACH (1968) and further developed by him in a paper
requested by the United Nations Economic and Social Council Advisory Committee on the
Application of Science and Technology to Development, 13 U.N. ESCOR, (Agenda Item
15(a)), U.N. Doc. E/AC.52/L.92 (1970).
4. J. BERTELSEN, THE PALESTINIAN ARAss (4 International Studies Series No. 02-043,
1976).
5. Id.at 7.
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structured framework for the study of nonstate nations [hereinafter
NSN].
In her introduction, Bertelsen sets forth five categories into
which data is to be classified according to her systems analysis: (1)
decision makers; (2) their goals; (3) available resources, defined as
"those things which affect outcomes and are controlled by the decision maker"; (4) environment, defined as "those things which affect
outcomes but are not controlled by the decision maker"; and (5)
components or missions, defined as "the projects undertaken by the
decision makers to achieve [their] goals." 7 Two other key concepts
used to characterize NSN goals are "durability," defined as continuing existence, and "audibility," defined as the ability of a NSN
to pursue its political objectives so as to be perceived by the community of nations and international organizations as being something other than simply a domestic problem of the NSN's "host
nation." 8 The categories are defined no further, because Bertelsen
alleges that "high specificity of terms can be premature." Even if
the categories were more illustrative, the pseudoscientific terminology which Bertelsen adopts does not flow naturally from the subject
matter and seems artificially inflicted upon the realm of political
science.
During the past decade, the Palestinian Arabs have been the
most audible of NSNs, and Bertelsen first tried out her systems
analysis on that group in a study published in 1976.10 Because of its
enduring topicality and since editor Bertelsen, its author, can be
expected to use her systems approach to best advantage, the Palestinian Arab case study is of particular interest.
Although Bertelsen notes in her concluding chapter that "[aill
the nonstate nations described in this book have deep historical
roots,"I" this statement appears a bit broad. In fact, one of the most
striking characteristics of the Palestinian Arab NSN is that while
it is widely perceived to have achieved a high level of durability, the
sense of a nationalistic Palestinian identity is generally considered
6. It is regrettable that Bertelsen provides no information on the origin of this term
although it appears preferable to such expressions as "mini-nationalists." See, e.g., L.
SNYDER, supra note 1, at 137-61.
7. Bertelsen, An Introductionto the Study of Nonstate Nations in InternationalPolitics,

in

NONSTATE NATIONS,

supra note 2, 1, 4.

8. Id. at 3.
9. Id. at 5.
10. J. BEnTLTSEN, supra note 4.
11. Bertelsen, The Nonstate Nation in International Politics: Some Observations, in
NONSTATE NATIONS, supra note 2, 245 [hereinafter cited as Some Observations].

19781

Book Review

to be of comparatively recent vintage. According to one historian of
the Arab nations, prior to the 1967 Six Day War most Palestinians
"had been content to merge their identity into a broad Arab, as
opposed to Palestinian, nationalism. Even the use of the name Palestine declined."'" Bertelsen, herself, noted in her original analysis
of the Palestinian Arabs that "little evidence appears of a distinctly
'Palestinian' Arab nationalism (as opposed to general Arab nationalism or 'greater Syrian' Arab nationalism)" until some time after
the establishment of the British Mandate in 1918.'3
Before proceeding to chronicle and "systems-analyze" the development of Palestinian nationalism, Bertelsen notes in a cursory
manner that "Palestinian Arabs have lived for centuries in an environment dominated politically by other national groups."" There
have indeed long been Arab inhabitants in the whole region; Bertelsen apparently considers this sufficient justification for referring to
the "deep historical roots" that the Palestinian NSN is supposed to
have. However, the defining of identities in this manner should
require a more exacting analysis. Inhabitants of a residential area
who receive eviction notices may well, as a result of their situation,
come to develop a sense of group neighborhood identity. However,
this sense of identity cannot be predated merely because the families involved have lived in that area for generations. The Palestinian
NSN, similarly, is not rooted in centuries of common culture, religion, language and experience distinct from those of the neighboring
populations.' 5 Instead, it is largely the result of the rise of Zionism
during this century and the creation of the state of Israel."
The point here is not simply to challenge Bertelsen's rather
loose vocabulary, but to question her lack of interest in the sudden
nature of the emergence of Palestinian nationalism and especially
her implicit dismissal of national self-perception as a major factor
in the assessment of NSN durability. A strong or developing sense
of national identity should at least be listed among an NSN's impor12. P. MANSFIELD, THE ARAB WoRL 343 (1976).
13. J. BErTELSEN, supra note 4, at 16.
14. Bertelsen, The PalestinianArabs, in NoNsT'ATE NATIONS, supra note 2, 7 [hereinafter

cited as PalestinianArabs].
15. See, e.g., Lewis, The Palestiniansand the PLO, 59 COMMENTARY 32, 33 (Jan. 1975)
[hereinafter cited as Lewis].
What the League of Nations included in 1917 in the British Mandate Territory known
as Palestine had been a cluster of provincial subdivisions within a larger political entity which
in Ottoman times had been considered culturally as well as geographically part of Greater
Syria. Id.
16. See generally Lewis, supra note 15.
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tant resources. 7 In the case of the Palestinians, the omission seems
particularly glaring given the fact that this resource has not always
existed and that marked changes in Palestinian psychological attitudes have occurred in the last few decades, most notably within the
last ten years. Moreover, the inherent limitations of the systems
categories are suggested by the notion that this national selfperception factor 8 could plausibly be considered as straddling both
resources and environment, rather than as fitting neatly into one
category or the other.
Although Bertelsen ignores the issue, the creation of a permanent Palestinian refugee population, in the Gaza Strip, on the West
Bank of the Jordan river, and in refugee camps in neighboring
Arab nations must be viewed as the second important phase in the
development of the Palestinian NSN. Touching upon the Palestinian refugee status, Bertelsen merely observes that it "did not suggest the durability of statehood, but rather threatened extinction
as a group, through resettlement in new lands."' 9 Since apparently
there was no strong Palestinian Arab identity prior to the 1948 War,
reference to the "extinction" of that identity by assimilation of
the people into the broader Arab population (sharing the same
language, religion and culture) seems exaggerated, however emotionally wrenching the exile from home must be, particularly to the
first generation of exiles. More importantly, Bertelsen's presentation of the threat of resettlement in new lands, compromising the
possibility of statehood, has by hindsight proven misleading and
fails to contribute to an understanding of the development of Palestinian nationalism.
Unlike other refugees displaced by war, the Palestinians were
not, as it turned out, allowed to assimilate into the neighboring
populations; the objective of the Arab governments being to make
the existence of the Jewish state a short-lived one. With the exception of Jordan, which annexed the West Bank in 1950, the Arab
countries denied Palestinians citizenship and opposed their resettlement.3 In other words, Bertelsen curiously emphasizes what could
have been considered to be a possible threat at the time, although
that threat was not to be substantially implemented.
17. Bertelsen, however, fails to do so. In contrast, contributor Milton da Silva recognizes

the importance of this factor and lists it as an important resource. See da Silva, The Basques
as a Nonstate Nation, in NONSTATE NATIONS, supra note 2, 98, 112 [hereinafter cited as da

Silva].
18. Bertelsen might have called it the "identity quotient."
19. PalestinianArabs, supra note 14, at 13.
20. Lewis, supra note 15, at 35.
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In indicating that refugee status "did not suggest the durability
of statehood," Bertelsen again ignores the psychological components of nationalism. Arguably, the absence of any prior sense of
Palestinian selfhood rendered the decades spent as unassimilated
refugees crucial to the development of Palestinian national identity.
Such identity, characterized by strong, even frequently violent assertions, has become an important factor in current Middle East
politics. 2 According to Professor Bernard Lewis, "[tihe emergence
of a distinctive Palestinian entity . . . may be seen as the joint
creation of Israel and the Arab states - the one by extruding the
Arabs of Palestine, the others by refusing to accept them."n
The presence of clearly perceptible criteria fails to compensate
for Bertelsen's imprecise definitions of her systems categories. Her
choice of decision makers, for instance, appears rather arbitrary; she
apparently makes determinations for one historical period based on
subsequent developments. Thus, for the 1956 to 1067 period, Decision Makers "A", "B" and "C" are listed, respectively, as the Arab
governments, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Fatah
guerilla organization. Outlining Fatah's environment, Bertelsen relies primarily upon a quotation to the effect that Fatah - which
only garnered public attention in 1965 - was throughout the period
working against "almost insurmountable odds: popular cynicism;
inter-Arab governmental conflict; limited resources; a defeatist apathy on the part of Palestinians; and a concerted campaign of innuendo and criticism in the Arab press to discredit Fatah as a group
of foreign-supported adventurers."" Given the reality of the situation, it is unclear for whom Fatah made decisions. It is also unlikely
that Bertelsen would have identified this initially small group of
revolutionaries as a decision making force at that time had the
organization not subsequently grown in credibility and
"audibility."'2 Were the relative importance of the various decision
makers clearer, it would also have been apparent that the PLO
assumed a major leadership role among the Palestinians only after
21. P. JUREIDINI & W. HAZEN, THE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT IN POLICS (1976). This work
includes a list of seventy-eight Palestinian terrorist operations occuring between July 1968
and June 1974. Id. at 77-82.
22. See Lewis, supra note 15, at 33.
23. PalestinianArabs, supra note 14, at 17-18, citing The Anatomy of Violence: Theoretical Reflections on PalestinianResistance, 25 MIDDLE EAST J. 180, 192 (Spring 1971).
24. Much of this audibility resulted from the Six Day War and the efforts of Yasir Arafat
who acquired a dominant position in the Executive Committee of the PLO during 1969. W.
QUANLT, F. JABBER & A. LESCH, THE Potxrcs oF PALEsTINAN NATONALISM 71 (1973). See also
P. JUREIDINI & W. HAZEN, supra note 21, at 19.
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the dramatic Arab defeat in the 1967 War. During the War, the Arab
governments, previously considered dominant decision makers,
were gradually perceived as being incapable of securing the dissolution of the Jewish state. "5
Bertelsen's analysis, which dates from early 1976, cannot be
expected to predict the sudden turn of events which has seen Egypt
assume a startlingly bold decision maker stature; pan-Arabism take
a position subordinate to obvious affirmations of national selfinterest; and the PLO confronted with the possibility of a reduced
role in the implementation of an autonomous Palestinian entity. It
is notable, however, that in referring to moderate local Palestinian
leaders as decision makers in the 1967 to 1973 period, Bertelsen
singles out the mayor of Hebron, who opposed commando operations, and states "[ilt seems plausible that other such Palestinians
existed and might have become audible if appropriate environmental and resource changes had occurred."" Important changes, occurring since publication of this book, may well result in the rapid rise
of a Palestinian entity led by such local Palestinian authorities.
Since the Palestinians constitute one of today's most prominent
NSNs, Bertelsen's analysis, even had it been more enlightening,
would not have filled the current scholarship gap as much as the
contributions made by the political scientists, historian, and social
anthropologist whom she has brought together for this book. There
is far less comprehensive material available in English on the other
NSNs covered, all of which, unlike the Palestinians, seem to have
a large degree of autonomy within a federal framework as their
primary goal rather than independence.
While the material presented on the Kurds, the Basques, the
Welsh and the Croatians is of particular interest, the authors of the
respective chapters appear to have varying degrees of difficulty respecting and implementing Bertelsen's systems-analysis format. In
a cogent presentation of the Croatians, Robin Remington uses the
requisite terminology, but displays a distinct awareness of its ambiguity and limitations. "One of the more difficult problems in applying the NSN conceptualization to Croatia is distinguishing between
resources and environment," she notes, emphasizing that the decision makers in question "were operating in circumstances where the
line between real and perceived resources was badly blurred.""
25. Lewis, supra note 15, at 36.
26. PalestinianArabs, supra note 14, at 24.
27. Remington, Ideology as a Resource: A Communist Case Study, in NONSTATE NATiONS,
supra note 2, 193, 207 [hereinafter cited as Remington).

19781

Book Review

That "blur," not peculiar to the Croatians, may well exist in
any passionately committed people. An optimistic appraisal of one's
position may be an effective device in cementing national purpose
and in rallying the support of other nations. The pretense of control
may lead to effective control; however, channeling all factors into
Bertelsen's either/or headings of resources and environment may
dissect a situation at the expense of understanding its subtle evolution.
Suggesting an emphasis significantly different from Bertelsen's, Remington begins her text by affirming that "[iun our terms
it is the self-perception of a people of their 'nationhood' and the
impact of that awareness on their behavior that counts." That
continuing, vigorous self-perception is fundamental in explaining
the persistence of long oppressed Basque and Kurdish aspirations,
even in the absence of support such as that received by the Palestinian cause from both the influential Arab world and such international bodies as the United Nations.
An elevated and principled sense of morality does not appear
to dominate international consideration of the political aspirations
of nonstate nations. As Charles Benjamin's report makes clear,2 the
Kurds have no nation-state supporting their claims to national sovereignty. Iranian financial and military support was abruptly terminated in 1975 when an agreement with Iraq was perceived by the
Shah to be in his nation's self-interest. Benjamin notes that the
recent sixteen-year phase of the Kurdish struggle for autonomy
within Iraq has endedY' No country has ever sought to present the
Kurdish matter to the United Nations; the Kurds today have lost
virtually all audibility.
The audibility and durability of the Croatians and the Welsh,
on the other hand, appear to have increased significantly in recent
years. The effective Plaid Cymru nationalist party has developed in
Wales, and contributor Ray Corrado notes that "[flor the first time
since the thirteenth century there are Welsh decision makers who
are attempting to organize and institutionalize the representation
of Wales in the international environment." 3 ' Yugoslavia's complex
policies with regard to its "nations" and national minorities have
not discouraged the rise of nationalistic feelings in the ancient Croa28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 194.
Benjamin, The Kurdish Nonstate Nation, in NONSTATE NATIONS, supra note 2, 69.
Id. at 94.
Corrado, The Welsh as a Nonstate Nation, in NONsTATE NATONS, supra note 2, 131,

200
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tian people.2 Remington predicts that upon Marshal Tito's death,
it is "almost a sure thing" that an extremist Croatian emigre faction
will "forcefully" achieve international audibility."
The Basques, as well as the Welsh, have a political party constituting their dominant decision maker. Efforts of the Basque political party, the Partido Nacionalista Vasco, have failed to garner
significant international support for Basque grievances. The
Basques, another ancient and fiercely individualistic people, speak
Euskera, a language which does not appear to belong to the IndoEuropean family of languages. Unlike the Croatians, the Spanish
Basques live in one of their country's richest areas. 3 Similarly, however, the presence or absence of a strong national leader is of great
consequence to their political evolution.3
Bertelsen evidently fails to perceive or adequately deal with
even the sketchy, obvious analogies that can be drawn between the
various nonstate nations covered in the book. Although Bertelsen
labels the case studies "comparative" system analyses and, in fact,
attempts some generalizations in a closing chapter, the reader is
forced to make independent analytical comparisons. While the uniform framework is intended to simplify that task, the contributors
fail to apply the systems analysis in a sufficiently consistent fashion
to achieve that result. The system, moreover, fails in the most fundamental of all tasks: it provides no significant assistance in formulating even the broadest criteria by which to evaluate an NSN's
proximity to its goals.
Bertelsen concludes her study by noting that "[tihe purpose
of the NSN system analyses has been simply to increase understanding and knowledge." 36 It is unfortunate, however, that decision
maker Bertelsen chose such fragile components in attempting to
achieve such a worthy goal ax d that she did not marshal greater
resources. However, her book has provided accessible data on some
of our nonstate nation brethren.
BarbaraM. Rubin*
32. See Remington, supra note 27, at 213-17.
33. Id. at 218.
34. See generally da Silva, supra note 17.
35. Support for this can be found from the fact that Franco's death has resulted in
increasec flexibility on the part of the Spanish government, and a new Spanish Constitution
is expected to grant the xasques at least a certain measure of autonomy. LE MoNzD, Dec.
29, 1977 - Jan. 4, 1978, at 1, col. 5.
36. Some Observations, supra note 11, at 256.
* B.A. Cal. State Univ. Northridge 1968; M.A. Cal. State Univ. Northridge 1974; J.D.
Loyola Law School of Los Angeles 1978.

